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out of the meeting, although their papers made it. These papers 
move in the direction set by Sally Haslanger’s powerful essay 
on “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by 
Reason (Alone),” moving beyond where we are stuck to deeper 
understanding of how and why (Haslanger 2008).
Peggy DesAutels (current Chair of the Committee on the 
Status of Women) is right to remind us that, beyond some 
rough head-counting, we are not in a position yet to answer 
many questions about trends, and much less about professional 
climate. Our professional association, the APA, has been late to 
begin collecting basic data on underrepresented groups in the 
academic profession of philosophy, although that work is (only) 
now starting. We are fortunate, however, to be able to learn even 
now from other fields where investigation of discrimination, 
bias, and climate issues is farther advanced. DesAutels is able 
to report to us from research in the STEM (Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Math) fields, that certain trends—overt 
discrimination and subtle bias—are likely relevant to philosophy 
due to the failure of women to reach “critical mass” of at least 
25% in the field. No one who has worked in our profession or 
attended our APA conferences will fail to see the potential of 
these findings for professional philosophy. It is the likelihood 
that STEM findings will bear on philosophy that situates the 
anecdotal evidence that continues to pile up. Linda Alcoff, whose 
moving and disturbing book Singing in the Fire: Stories of Women 
in Philosophy (Alcoff 2003) collected harrowing tales from 
successful women in the profession (raising the question of what 
might have happened to less successful ones), acknowledges 
that the past decades have seen significant and positive changes 
in the situation and prospects of women in philosophy. Yet 
current reports, including ones now collecting in the recently 
emergent philosophical blogosphere, reveal that stunning and 
overt forms of sexism, including physical aggression, are not, 
it seems, uncommon. Michelle Saint, a recently minted Ph.D., 
digs into the new virtual world surrounding our profession, with 
decidedly mixed results. I repeat: anecdotal evidence remains 
important against the backdrop of what has been established 
in other professional academic areas through careful research. 
The anecdotal evidence should make us feel an urgent need 
to have such careful research done for our own discipline and 
profession; in the meanwhile, it brings to life vividly what it is like 
to live in those worlds characterized by “overt discrimination and 
subtle bias,” and worse, by sexual predation, harassment, and 
demeaning insult.
Our contributors, however, do not leave us in despondency. 
On the contrary, they bring forward not only fresh information, but 
also reports of effective interventions, grass roots movements, 
novel channels of information, and targeted trainings and 
practices, that offer us things most of us can actually do and 
insist upon, as well as learn and educate about, to start moving 
our profession forward in more gender-just and gender-friendly 
directions, as well as toward greater diversity, desperately 
needed, of other kinds. DesAutels conducts workshops, based 
in the body of research already available, aimed at advancing 
women faculty and improving the gender climate in STEM 
fields, targeting basic and changeable features of academic 
practices and physical environments, and this could clearly be 
done in philosophy. Alcoff is one architect of a forthcoming web 
resource, “The Pluralist’s Guide to Philosophy,” that will provide, 
at long last, fair and accurate information on opportunities for 
graduate work in areas such as feminist philosophy, critical 
race theory, GLBT philosophy, and continental philosophy that 
are marginalized and misrepresented in the disproportionately 
influential Leiter Report. Alcoff urges us to think politically 
and institutionally about how to change obstacles that are 
politically and institutionally maintained within our universities 
and within our profession. Michelle Saint emphasizes the 
novel potential of the professional philosophical blogosphere, 
despite its own dangers and morale traps. She directs us (as 
do DesAutels and Alcoff) to the unprecedented and revealing 
blog, What Is It Like To Be A Woman in Philosophy? (http://
beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/), and its more 
recent pendant blog, What We’re Doing About What It’s Like 
(http://whatweredoingaboutwhatitslike.wordpress.com/). Saint 
also alerts us to the aggressive public stand taken by several 
male philosophers on ways to discredit known sexual harassers. 
The hierarchical structures, formal and informal, of academic 
institutions and departments have made it difficult for those 
most vulnerable to abusive and disrespectful treatment to 
speak up or find allies within or beyond their environments. 
The virtual philosophical community might change that in 
important ways, by recruiting new and wide communities of 
concern and solidarity.
Finally, Rae Langton returns us to the question of what the 
profession itself can accomplish institutionally. She provides 
us with the brief overview of a report on women in philosophy 
in universities in Australia, compiled with almost complete 
participation of Philosophy Departments and sponsored by 
the Australasian Association of Philosophy, the counterpart 
to our APA. Here we get useful comparative data and 
recommendations. Now all we need is something to compare 
them to.
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Is the Climate any Warmer for Women in 
Philosophy?
Peggy DesAutels
University of Dayton
Is the climate any warmer for women in philosophy? 
Unfortunately, there is no way to answer this question with 
much confidence. There are no systematic measures of even 
the numbers of women in philosophy let alone systematic 
measures of the overall climate. When we add in that the 
climate for women varies significantly from department to 
department and subfield to subfield, assessing the climate 
for women in philosophy becomes even more difficult. I take 
climate to include overt instances of sex discrimination and 
sexual harassment as well as cumulative instances of subtle 
bias against women. Both overt and subtle contributors to 
climate are difficult to ferret out and summarize even for a 
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single department let alone for such a wide-ranging group of 
people as philosophers and the diverse departments these 
philosophers inhabit.
The APA is significantly behind other professional 
organizations in collecting data about and assessing the climate 
for underrepresented groups. There are a number of efforts 
underway to remedy this. As you may know, some philosophers 
have formed themselves into the Women in Philosophy Task 
Force. The group’s subcommittee on data (Sally Haslanger, Kate 
Norlock, Linda Alcoff, Miriam Solomon, and I) recently sent a 
letter to the APA Board of Officers that met at the beginning of 
November 2010. The letter emphasizes the need for gathering 
data on underrepresented groups in philosophy and urges the 
Board to take specific immediate steps to obtain relevant data 
about APA members and about hiring outcomes. The APA 
Committee on the Status of Women and the Inclusiveness 
Committee were co-signatories of the letter. A special thanks 
goes to Miriam Solomon for her relentless efforts in drafting this 
letter and moving it forward. As a result of these efforts, the APA 
agreed to gather data on APA members and from departments 
advertising in JFP. Nonetheless, there has been difficulty bringing 
new software online, so it remains unclear how much can be 
done anytime soon. The APA board is supposed to provide a 
report by the beginning of February updating the Inclusiveness 
Committee and the Committee on the Status of Women on its 
progress in collecting data, so stay tuned.
Meanwhile, more qualitative data on the climate 
for women in philosophy is being collected, albeit non-
systematically, by a recent blog entitled “What is it Like to Be 
a Woman in Philosophy” (http://beingawomaninphilosophy.
wordpress.com/) and the even more recent “What We’re 
Doing About What Its Like: Making Things Better for Women 
in Philosophy?” (http://whatweredoingaboutwhatitslike.
wordpress.com/). Female and even a few male philosophers 
have sent in short accounts of their individual experiences, both 
negative and positive, related to being a woman in philosophy. 
The stories range from horrifying to quite encouraging. But 
for the most part, readers write in that when strung together, 
the stories leave them discouraged and depressed. At the 
very least, philosophy appears to house a number of very bad 
apples who harass and discriminate against women often 
with impunity. But exactly how many overt harassers and 
discriminators are at large within philosophy at this time is 
impossible to determine. Meanwhile, if you haven’t yet visited 
this blog, I encourage that you do so.
Although we know very little about the degrees and 
extents of either overt or subtle discrimination against women 
in philosophy today, the National Science Foundation has 
funded a number of studies and initiatives tied to hiring and 
advancing women faculty in Science, Engineering, Technology, 
and Math (STEM). There are clearly a number of parallels 
between issues tied to STEM women faculty and those tied 
to philosophy women faculty. For example, studies show 
that there are special climate-related issues for any minority 
group that has failed to reach critical mass in a particular field. 
Critical mass is reached when a group comprises at least 
25% of a field. Right now, our best calculations estimate that 
women faculty comprise approximately 23% of philosophy 
faculty in the United States. For some subfields in philosophy 
this percentage is lower. Although I have no data to back me 
up, based on my own experiences at various conferences, my 
guess is that the percentages of philosophers who are women 
are even lower in such subfields as metaphysics, philosophy 
of mind, and philosophy of language, and are higher in such 
fields as feminist philosophy, applied ethics, and possibly even 
philosophy of science.
When a minority group does not reach critical mass in a 
field, studies show that it is far more likely that this group will 
be subject to both overt discrimination and subtle bias that 
in turn prevents members of that group from being hired or 
advanced. Certainly, other factors contribute to a continuing 
chilly climate for women in philosophy, but I think that much 
insight can be gained by focusing on issues tied to the failure of 
women faculty in philosophy to reach critical mass. It would be 
interesting, for example, to compare the climates for women 
in departments in which women have reached or surpassed 
critical mass and those that fall far short of the mark. Although 
such studies have not been done, I can report from personal 
experience the climate warmth in my own department. My 
department is quite large (fifteen or so tenure/tenure-track 
positions) and is very women- and feminist- friendly. I maintain 
that much of the warmth of our departmental climate is tied 
to the fact that we have seven tenured and tenure-track 
women in the department, two of whom are full professors. 
Thus over forty percent of our philosophy faculty is women 
and thirty-three percent of our department’s full professors is 
women. It is approaching “normal” to be both a woman and 
a philosopher at my particular university. Having a significant 
number of women in a department means that overt instances 
of discrimination against and harassment of women faculty 
by other faculty members in the department are much more 
likely to be challenged and reduced. When departments add 
in training on implicit bias and implement best practices to 
prevent it, even the more subtle forms of discrimination have 
a better chance of being identified and reduced.
Unfortunately, the ratio of women to men philosophy 
faculty found in my own department is anything but normal 
nationwide. What I would like to do with the remainder of my 
time is describe some of the findings of relevance to the climate 
for women in philosophy tied to implicit bias and a lack of critical 
mass. I have been building my knowledge on this topic over 
the past several years, ever since I began serving as a principal 
on a National Science Foundation ADVANCE grant. This grant 
was awarded to four Dayton, Ohio regional degree-granting 
institutions: University of Dayton, Wright State University, 
Central State University, and Air Force Institute of Technology. 
Like many other ADVANCE grants awarded throughout the 
country, this is a five-year, multi-million dollar grant given out 
by the National Science Foundation with the goal of increasing 
the representation and advancement of women in academic 
science and engineering careers, thereby contributing to the 
development of a more diverse science and engineering 
workforce. My job on this grant is to conduct workshops for 
faculty and staff at all four institutions on best practices tied to 
increasing the numbers of and advancing women faculty in 
STEM fields. One of my emphases is on how best to recognize 
and address implicit gender biases that contribute to barriers 
against recruiting and advancing women STEM faculty. Although 
NSF funds only projects tied to STEM women faculty, much of 
the research and best practices coming out of these grants 
are directly relevant to climate issues for women faculty in 
philosophy. I should note here that there is at least one other 
philosopher, Carla Fehr, a philosopher of science at Iowa State, 
who has actively worked on an NSF ADVANCE project.
For a very nice summary of relevant research to date on 
recruiting and advancing women STEM faculty, see Beyond 
Bias and Barriers: Fufilling the Potential of Women in Academic 
Science and Engineering (National Academy of Sciences, 
2007), put out both online and in hardcover. For more general 
gender-related psychological and neuroscientific research, see 
Delusions of Gender: How Our Minds, Society, and Neurosexism 
Create Difference (Fine, 2010). And for specific work on gender 
schemas and the role they play in the advancement of women 
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in academia, Why So Slow?: The Advancement of Women 
(Valian, 1998). For those unfamiliar with Virginia Valian’s work, 
gender schemas (or implicit biases) involve non-conscious 
expectations or stereotypes associated with members of a group 
that guide perceptions and behaviors. Schemas influence the 
judgments of both non-group members and group members 
themselves. These biased judgments affect hiring and 
advancement and result in an accumulation of disadvantage. 
Schemas are widely culturally shared; both men and women 
hold them about gender; both whites and people of color hold 
them about race. Of special relevance to philosophy, schemas 
are more likely to be invoked when groups (e.g. women) lack 
critical mass. We no longer rely on group-based schemas when 
there are many individuals, since we cannot differentiate among 
these individuals by resorting to these schemas. On the other 
hand, when there are very few women and minorities on a 
faculty, schemas are much more likely to be invoked.
Some of the more striking studies showing the effects of 
implicit bias on judgments include: (1) A study involving hiring 
for orchestras. When auditioners were behind a screen, the 
percentage of female new hires for orchestral jobs increased 
25-46% (Goldin and Rouse, 2000). (2) A study involving hiring of 
faculty for psychology departments. When evaluating identical 
application packages, male and female university psychology 
professors preferred 2:1 to hire “Brian” over “Karen” (Steinpreis, 
Anders, and Ritzke, 1999). And (3) A study examining letters 
of recommendation for successful medical school faculty 
applicants. Letters for men were longer and contained more 
references to the applicants’ CVs, publications, patients, and 
colleagues. Letters for women were shorter and contained 
more references to personal life as well as more “doubt raisers” 
(e.g., hedges, faint praise, and irrelevancies). Comments in 
letters for women included: “It’s amazing how much she’s 
accomplished.” “It appears her health is stable.” “She is close 
to my wife” (Trix and Psenka, 2003).
Other studies of relevance to the climate for women in 
philosophy are tied to women’s reticence to participate in 
fields where women are outnumbered by men. As Cordelia 
Fine points out, there are a number of subtle ways that women 
can be sent the message that they “don’t belong” in particular 
fields. For instance, one study shows how changing the 
physical environment from “geeky” to “less geeky” (e.g., from 
a room containing Star Trek posters, geeky comics, technical 
magazines, junk food, video game boxes, electronic equipment 
to a room containing art posters, general interest magazines, 
and water bottles) significantly increased women’s expressed 
interest in technical jobs and internships (Fine, 45-46). I was 
reminded by this study of my own graduate student days. All 
four walls of the graduate student lounge were lined with blown-
up photos of past chairs of the department of philosophy—all 
of them white males. In another study of special relevance 
to philosophy meetings, advanced women undergraduates 
were attached to equipment that recorded heart rate and skin 
conductance and then shown advertising videos for a Math, 
Science, and Engineering (MSE) conference.
There were two, near-identical videos, depicting about 
150 people. However, in one video the ratio of men to 
women approximated the actual gender ratio of MSE 
degrees: there were three men to every woman. In 
the second video, men and women were featured 
in equal numbers. Women who saw the gender-
equal video responded very much like men, both 
physiologically and in their sense of belonging and 
interest in the conference. But for women who saw 
the more realistically imbalanced version, it was a very 
different experience. They became more aroused—an 
indicator of physiological vigilance. They expressed 
less interest in attending the conference when it was 
gender unbalanced. …And although women and men 
who saw the gender-balanced video very strongly 
agreed that they belonged there, the conviction of 
this agreement among women who saw a gender 
imbalance was significantly lower. (Fine, 42)
How many times have I attended a philosophy conference that 
consisted almost entirely of men? Although there were many 
reasons why I decided to engage in feminist philosophy, one 
of these reasons was simply so that I could attend feminist 
conferences where for once the women outnumbered the 
men—where for once I belonged.
Let’s go back to the question of whether the climate is 
warming for women in philosophy. Not only are the chances 
quite slim of the climate’s warming significantly as long as 
woman faculty fail to reach critical mass, but the APA’s ability 
adequately to assess past, present, and future climates for 
women in philosophy is grossly inadequate. One of the first 
expectations for those institutions receiving NSF ADVANCE 
grants is that there is an assessment of the success of these 
grants in achieving NSF’s goal of warming the climate for STEM 
women faculty. The only way to assess the degree to which 
this goal is achieved is to design and implement pre- and 
post-grant climate surveys that are distributed to both female 
and male STEM faculty. These surveys are then analyzed for 
sex effects tied to the degree to which responders agree with 
such statements as: My department does not engage in sex 
discrimination; my department is open to women; women 
have influence in the department; I am able to maintain a 
good balance between my personal and professional life; and 
so on. Such surveys are difficult to design well and analyze 
meaningfully especially when they involve multiple institutions. 
As a result, these surveys need the expertise of those trained in 
psychology. Ideally, we will find ways to conduct similar surveys 
in the APA. Unfortunately, however, NSF doesn’t provide funding 
for philosophy-related projects. I think an important next step for 
both the Women in Philosophy Task Force and the relevant APA 
committees is to identify expertise and funding for collecting 
meaningful demographic data and conducting climate surveys. 
Once this is done, we can begin to target the chilliest aspects of 
the climate for women in philosophy and apply best practices 
towards warming these aspects. As the current Chair for the 
APA’s Committee for the Status of Women and as a member 
of the Women in Philosophy Task Force, I will do what I can 
to promote and collaborate on important data collection and 
climate assessments. Who knows? Perhaps someday in the 
not-too-distant future, women in philosophy will finally reach 
a critical mass; all philosophers will live in balmy warmth; and 
no APA meetings will involve blizzards.
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A Call for Climate Change
Linda Martín Alcoff
Hunter College and CUNY Graduate Center
The story in a nutshell about the climate for women in 
philosophy is this: Although there are more of us than ever, 
the climate is still bad. We need to take serious steps toward 
climate change, but the philosophy profession as a whole is as 
full of denial about this situation as Fox News is full of denials 
about global warming.
Recently I was sitting in a coffee shop near NYU, reading 
the blog “What Is It Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy?” and 
finding myself, with some embarrassment, tearing up.1 The 
blog is over-full with stories of disrespect, harassment, sexual 
objectification, even an attempted rape at an APA conference. 
Where else but in the U.S. military are women the targets of 
such regular abuse by their own close colleagues? I have been 
in departments where new female graduate students are looked 
over as the new meat in town. At the department holiday party 
I attended just a few months ago, one of my female students 
said afterward, “That was a good party! No one groped me in 
the corner this year.” Turns out that happened six years ago and 
she has not been back to a department party since that time.
I have also known about consensual relationships that 
developed between male faculty and female students that 
seemed to be benign, but there continues to be an adverse 
effect on the general credibility of women students (even 
women faculty) when such relationships are even suspected: 
it raises the specter of favoritism and unfair advantages, a 
specter that can tar anyone’s career. Even more disturbing 
is that, in the consensual relationships I have seen between 
male faculty and female graduate students, the women 
almost always drop out of the field. Causality is, of course, 
difficult to trace with any certainty, yet one begins to wonder. 
Perhaps the psychic shift from apprentice to lover creates a 
category transference that changes one’s self-understanding. I 
remember vividly a brilliant young female philosophy student 
who was very shaken up by a come-on from her (much older) 
main professor, asking me, “Was that what all his compliments 
about my exams and papers were really about?” She later 
“chose” not to pursue philosophy.
But the principal issue that comes out in sharp relief from 
the blog “What Is It Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy?” is not 
about harassment or come-ons but the thousand daily cuts that 
collectively dissuade women from staying in: the aggressive and 
peremptory dismissals in seminar, the a priori rejections and 
derision of feminist philosophy, the ignoring, the assumptions 
that affirmative action is the only reason someone has been 
accepted, the nasty notes put in mailboxes and under one’s 
door, such as the note that just said “whore “ in large letters.
Some men have been writing into this blog with surprise, 
real concern, indignation. I take their concern to be legitimate, 
and don’t think we should scoff too much at their surprise and 
naiveté. They live and work in a parallel universe, a profession 
without sexual overtones to be negotiated and managed, and 
most have never heard women talk in an honest way about the 
situation they experience.
In my experience, women in our profession are, as a group, 
afraid to complain, loathe to complain, absolutely committed 
to not complaining. When I began editing the collection that 
became Singing in the Fire: Tales of Women in Philosophy more 
than ten years ago, I found that senior women, even women with 
tenure who had great jobs and enormous prestige, were quite 
fearful of looking like self-indulgent whiners or political activists 
rather than philosophers.2 Several declined my invitation to 
write for the book with letters outlining these concerns. They 
were afraid they’d lose male friends and support just by the act 
of truthfully describing their experiences of making it into the 
profession. And, of course, they were right to be afraid. We get 
reputations for being certain sorts of philosophers, for operating 
in certain sorts of ways professionally. And successful women 
who are attractive are whispered about, as using their sexuality 
for advancement. When even tenured and powerful women 
keep silent about this situation, it keeps well-meaning men in 
the dark, lets perpetrators get away with murder, and maintains 
the climate of victim-blaming.
Reading the blog (and Singing in the Fire) will also 
convey that there has been some significant change over the 
last 20-25 years. Many more women (at least white women) 
are in the field, without a doubt. Some female faculty are 
portrayed in the blog as hostile to women students, as even 
harassers themselves. I don’t doubt these stories, but I’d want 
to underscore that the overall situation in philosophy is hardly 
one in which male graduate students are preyed upon sexually 
or experience objectifying remarks on a regular basis, as well 
as hostility in seminars and barely concealed disbelief that they 
might be equally smart. Some men may indeed get belittled, 
but (white) men as a group are not viewed with skepticism 
about their abilities or their right to be in the profession given 
their gender identity.
Anecdotal reports need to be interpreted in light of an 
understanding of the overall situation. Statistics can help.
Some Recent Statistics:
In 2008 the percentage of PhD’s earned by women in the U.S. 
in all fields was a respectable 46%.3
But, of course, this is not distributed evenly across the 
disciplines. Two-thirds of Ph.D.’s in Education were female; 
58% of PhD’s in the social sciences were female. Only 28% of 
PhD’s in the physical sciences went to women, and only 22% 
of those in engineering. This is still a big increase from 1978, 30 
years earlier, when only 10% of PhD’s in the physical sciences 
went to women and 2% in engineering.
In terms of racial and ethnic identities, 23% of PhD’s in 
2008 were earned by minorities who reported their identities. 
Asians earned the most, 2,543, with African Americans earning 
2,030, Latinos 1,765, and American Indians 123. Interestingly, 
there is a noticeable concentration of minority doctorate 
recipients in a small number of institutions, a noticeably greater 
institutional concentration than for the doctorates as a whole. 
This is an important phenomenon that requires analysis. I would 
suggest it largely accords with the situation in philosophy.4
In regard to philosophy, as we know, the numbers of 
women are much more comparable to the physical sciences 
than to the humanities, a fact that no doubt pleases those among 
us with closet or otherwise unexamined scientistic tendencies. 
The numbers are striking: 21% of employed philosophers are 
women, compared to 41% in the humanities as a whole.
Also striking is the following. About 27% of PhD’s in 
philosophy have been going to women on average over the 
last 15-20 years (there may be a bump in a year here and there, 
but the average remains about this). In the mid-1980s the 
percentage was 24%. This indicates that we have been stuck 
